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Is there anything that makes the contract theory of a mixed legal system distinctive 
from that of the Common Law? It is proposed, in attempting to answer this question, 
to take one such mixed legal system, Scots Law, and compare its theory of contract 
with the still largely dominant will theory of English Contract Law.  It will be 
suggested that the origin of the contract theory of the mixed legal system of Scotland 
is itself mixed, and that this mixedness is not simply that of the traditional mix of 
Roman with Common Law that one would expect from a so-called mixed legal 
system, but also a mix of natural law, Aristotelian ideas, with a conception of law as a 
rational discipline emphasising the human will as a constituting obligational force.  It 
will be further argued that the peculiar obligational framework of Scots Law gives its 
contract law distinctive characteristics, both conceptual and functional, from that of 
the Common Law.    
The following observations are a contribution towards remedying a relative 
deficit in contract theory from the pen of Scottish thinkers over the past one hundred 
and fifty years or so. Whereas, over that period of time, admittedly many Common 
Law works have been published which have taken a purely and unashamedly practical 
approach to contract law, the Common Law has also benefited from a steady stream 
of important works on contract which have given due place to theoretical analysis.1 
By contrast, the few authors of the same period to have produced treatises on Scots 
contract law – William Gloag,2 David Walker,3 and W W McBryde4 – all chose to 
                                                 
* The Edinburgh Law School. The author acknowledges the helpful comments of his colleague 
Professor H L MacQueen on a draft of this article. 
1 See, for instance, from the nineteenth century, J Newland, Treatise on Contracts within the 
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity (Philadelphia: Farrand & Co, 1806), S Comyn, The Law of 
Contracts and Promises (London: J Butterworth, 1807), H Colebrooke, Treatise on Obligations and 
Contracts (London: 1818), J Chitty, Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts (London: S Sweet, 
1826), C G Addison, Treatise on the Law of Contracts and Liabilities Ex Contractu (London: Benning 
& Co, 1847, two vols), S M Leake, The Elements of the Law of Contracts (London: Stevens & Sons,  
1867), F Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity (London: Stevens & Sons, 1876), and W 
Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879). In the past forty 
years or so, important modern contributions to contractual theory have included G Gilmore, The Death 
of Contract (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ Press, 1974), C Fried, Contract as Promise 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ Press, 1981), P S Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986), and S Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford; OUP, 2004). See also P Benson (ed), The Theory 
of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). In addition, there is a genre of economic 
analysis of contractual theory largely written with the Common Law in mind: see, for instance, P 
Bolton & M Dewatripont, Contract Theory (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005). 
2 See, principally, W Gloag, The Law of Contract (Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 1914; 1929, 2nd ed; 2nd 
ed reprinted Collieston, Aberdeenshire: Caledonian Books, 1985). 
3 In the third edition of his work, The law of contracts and related obligations in Scotland (London: T 
& T Clark, 1995), Walker provides (at para 1.19 f) a brief summary of the principal theories of contract 
law, and states his preference for the ‘agreement theory’, dismissing most of the other theories for the 
reason that they have no support in Scottish authority. 
4 His principal work being The Law of Contract in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 2007, 3rd ed). 
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focus almost exclusively on practical aspects of the law. Though it is true that 
Scotland’s most prominent recent legal theorist, the late Professor Sir Neil 
MacCormick, wrote about contract and promissory theory, he did so largely as part of 
a wider philosophical investigation into legal institutions rather than with regard to the 
law of obligations.5 One finds somewhat more by way of jurisdiction specific contract 
theory in the writings of the late Sir T B Smith, and, more recently, a few writers from 
other jurisdictions have offered illuminating, if sporadic, observations on Scots 
contract theory,6 but it remains the case that not since the seventeenth century when 
James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, offered his own seminal views on the nature of law, 
including the law of obligations, has there been a distinctive and systematic attempt to 
analyse why precisely it is that contractual undertakings should be enforced within 
Scots Law. In what follows, the contributions of Stair and the major Scottish jurists 
who followed in his footsteps must therefore be considered.  
Why should any of this be of interest to Common Lawyers? Evidently its 
primary utility is likely to be comparative. It is becoming more commonplace to set 
the various European legal systems in a comparative context, either from a desire 
simply to understand them better or, increasingly, with a view to harmonising them. 
In this regard, a deeper understanding of the differences in contract theory between 
different systems can help to make more sense of the varied characterisations of 
similar fact situations adopted by national legal systems. Secondly, and of more 
immediate practical relevance, a not insignificant number of contract cases are 
appealed from the Court of Session to the House of Lords, and the speeches of their 
Lordships in such appeals are subsequently commented upon and cited by English 
academics and judges. A recent example of this is the decision of their Lordships in J 
& H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd,7 commented upon in a number of English legal 
journals.8 The author of one such commentary began his observations by remarking 
that that there appeared to be no difference in the law applied in this Scottish appeal to 
that prevailing in England.9 That observation was undoubtedly true in the context of 
the specific subject matter of that case, namely the application of a section of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, but it will be suggested below that there are in fact structural and 
theoretical differences between Scottish and English contract law, differences which 
have the potential to influence judicial outcomes in non-statutory contract cases, and 
differences of which it is therefore important for lawyers from both systems to be 
aware.  
It is proposed in the rest of this paper firstly to outline the mixed nature of 
Scots contract theory through an examination of its historical origins, and secondly to 
examine certain characteristics of the modern law which reflect that contract theory. 
From this, certain conclusions will be drawn about the possible future of Scots as well 
as English contract theory. 
 
                                                 
5 See Professor Sir N MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), especially ch 10 (on voluntary obligations); also Institutions of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 
especially paras 7.2 and 13.5, where there is a brief discussion of contractual theory. 
6 Useful in this respect is Gerard Lubbe, ‘Formation of Contract’, in K Reid & R Zimmermann (ed), A 
History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford: OUP, 2000, 2 vols), vol 2, pp 1 – 46. 
7 [2007] UKHL 9, [2007] 1 WLR 670. 
8 For instance, see K Low, ‘Repair, rejection & rescission: an uneasy resolution’, (2007) LQR 536 – 
541; K Loi, ‘Sale of goods in Scotland - repairing defects in the law: J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd’, 
[2007] JBL 807 – 814; M Bridge, ‘Sale of goods in Scotland - a second tender: J & H Ritchie Ltd v 
Lloyd Ltd’, [2007] JBL 814 – 819.  
9 K Low, ‘Repair, rejection & rescission’ (cit at fn 8), at 536.  
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2. The nature and development of contract theory 
 
(a)  The place of contract within the obligational framework 
The restatement of some basic obligational ideas will not, it is hoped, be out of place 
in this discussion, in highlighting some of the distinctions between Scots and 
Common Law obligations theory, particularly that of contract. 
An obligation is seen in Scots Law, as it was in Roman Law, as a legal tie by 
which a party or parties are bound to a certain performance. Rather than the three 
obligations to which the Common Lawyer is used to recognising, five obligations are 
recognised in Scots private law, namely contract, promise (sometimes called  
unilateral promise), delict (the Common Law’s tort), unjustified enrichment, and 
negotiorum gestio (the unauthorised management of another’s affairs, or benevolent 
intervention as it is sometimes called). While the idea of an obligation may be Roman, 
the present obligational taxonomy derives from a native classification developed, 
though not in quite the modern terms just stated, by Stair, and not from the Roman 
Law’s fourfold classification of obligations into contract, quasi-contract, delict and 
quasi-delict. While it is sometimes suggested that other obligations ought to be 
recognised by the law, such as pre-contractual liability (equating perhaps to the culpa 
in contrahendo of German Law),10 or that new terminology should be developed to 
explain features of the existing law more logically, such as the concept of unjustified 
sacrifice,11 the five obligations listed above remain the established ones within Scots 
private law. 
There are obvious contrasts with the Common Law. Whereas English Law 
does permit a contract lacking mutual consideration to be made under seal, Scots Law 
gives a much more favoured position to the unreciprocated undertaking. This is self-
evidently so by virtue of the separate obligation of promise, but in addition certain 
features of contract law (such as the enforceability of gratuitous contracts) reinforce 
this. The Common Lawyer will not recognise negotiorum gestio as an enforceable 
obligation, the Common Law being traditionally antagonistic to a claim for expenses 
connected with officious intermeddling. Such a claim was available under Roman 
Law, and was received with very little alteration into Scots Law.  
Analytically, in Scots Law the distinct, albeit related, categories of obligation 
are each able to be described by reference to a general principle explaining liability 
within the obligation: for contract, pacta sunt servanda (agreements are to be 
enforced), an analogous notion operating in respect of  promise (promises ought to be 
kept); for delict, reparation ought to be made for loss caused by wrongful conduct 
(damnum injuria datum); for unjustified enrichment, enrichments retained without 
justification must be disgorged;12 and for negotiorum gestio, the reasonable expenses 
of unauthorised administration must be met. The Common Law, with its more recent 
tradition of recognising a unified law of obligations, has been reticent to accept that 
such fundamental principles might underlie the different obligations. One sees the 
effect of this reticence in the continued absence from English Law of a general action 
                                                 
10 Following the recovery permitted in Walker v Milne and the line of cases derived from it: see further 
below at section 3(d), and also at M Hogg, Obligations (Edinburgh: Avizandum, 2006, 2nd ed),  
hereinafter referred to as ‘Hogg’, paras 3.32 – 3.36, 5.13 – 5.20.   
11 As I myself have argued in Hogg, ch 5.  
12 A principle frequently stated by the courts as referable to Roman principles, especially the equitable 
maxim of the Roman jurist Pomponius ‘nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura’: see, for instance, 
citation of the maxim by Lord President Hope in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian 
Regional Council 1995 SC 151, at 155. 
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for the reparation of wrongful behaviour (such as is found in the general delictual 
action in Scots Law) and the difficulties which the principle of unjustified enrichment 
still has in finding general acceptance within the Common Law community. While no 
Scots lawyer would dream of questioning the value or very existence of unjustified 
enrichment as a discreet obligation, by contrast Common Lawyers continue to raise 
just such questions.13 The only notable attempt to promote a ‘unifying principle’ 
approach to obligations in the Common Law has been Professor Atiyah’s rather 
unconvincing theory of a grand, unifying principle for the whole of the law 
obligations, namely that the existence of all obligations can be explained as stemming 
from either the conferral of a benefit or from the creation of detrimental reliance.14 
Such an attempt at an overarching general obligational principle has been eschewed in 
Scots Law, which has (sensibly it is suggested) contented itself with going no further 
that positing unifying causes of action for the separate obligations, and restating the 
traditionally held view that there is a division between voluntary and imposed 
obligations. 
The division between obligations (which concern rights in personam) and 
property (which concerns rights in rem) is rigidly enforced in Scots Law. This means, 
for instance, that there is no question in Scotland of treating proprietary remedies as 
part of the law of unjustified enrichment, as English Law does when placing certain 
proprietary remedies within its remedial category of restitution.15 All remedies within 
unjustified enrichment give rise to personal and not real rights.   
In acknowledging the importance to the legal theory of Scots Law of its 
distinct obligations, it must not be forgotten however that there is most assuredly a 
degree of interaction between the five obligations recognised. At the present time, 
there is a growing appreciation of the principles and rules determining how such 
interaction occurs, especially whether and how concurrency of liability may arise 
between different obligations, and whether, for instance, there can be said to be any 
‘hierarchy’ of obligations which ought to impact upon the proper determination of 
cases in which it is argued that a number of obligations might conceivably arise.16 I 
have argued elsewhere that there are at least two separate hierarchical models of 
obligations which each express certain fundamental truths about the nature of the 
various obligations and which each influence, in certain cases, outcomes in cases 
which raise issues of concurrency or other interaction of obligations.17   
 
                                                 
13 See S Hedley, ‘‘Unjust Enrichment’: The Same Old Mistake?’, in A Robertson (ed), The Law of 
Obligations: Connections and Boundaries (London: UCL Press, 2004). 
14 See Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ch 2. 
15 And there is no question of calling any of the categories of obligation after a remedy, as with the 
Common Law’s ‘restitution’. 
16 The notion of a hierarchy of obligations was promoted in modern times by T B Smith: see discussion 
infra. It is also discussed in Hogg, paras 1.75 – 1.77. 
17 One hierarchy places unjustified enrichment below contract, promise and delict, on the basis that 
valid contractual or promissory entitlements are a justification for the retention of an enrichment, and 
delictual claims are not (save very exceptionally) calculated by reference to any gain that may have 
been made by the wrongdoer. Another hierarchy places delict and unjustified enrichment above 
contract and promise, on the basis that delictual or enrichment liability is always operative in the 
background, arising as it does at law, unless specifically excluded by a voluntary undertaking. These 
two different hierarchies need not be seen as contradictory; rather, they each express fundamental ideas 
about the nature of the different obligations which are equally valid. Which of the two hierarchies 
informs thinking in a specific case will depend upon the issue raised by the facts of the case, e.g. 
whether a contractual clause excluding delictual liability is at issue. See on these hierarchical issues, 
Hogg, paras 1.75 to 1.77.  
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(b) Stair’s view of obligations, especially contract 
 
Any understanding of the nature of the Scots law of obligations, including the theory 
of Scots contract, must begin with the Institutions of the Law of Scotland of James 
Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, the first edition of which was published in 1681, a second 
following in 1693. Stair was largely responsible for providing the foundations of the  
native taxonomy of Scots obligations law outlined above, albeit that his precise 
classification and terminology is not exactly that of the modern law. Stair was also 
responsible for grounding Scots contract theory in a mix of natural law and reason. 
Stair, like the Dutch jurists Pufendorf, Grotius and Gudelinus, belonged to the 
Northern School of reformed, early Enlightenment, natural lawyers. The common 
feature of the legal theory of this School is its blend of the medieval view of the 
importance of natural law as a superior body of rules with an early modern view of 
the importance of man as a rational being. Stair continually stresses in his writing 
both the importance of law as a rational discipline – law is “the dictate of reason”18 – 
as well as man’s natural obedience to such law.19 Furthermore, he sees a fundamental 
link between God and reason, in that God, even as a supremely free and potent being, 
chooses to act in a rational and reasonable way.20 Man shares this adherence to the 
dictate of reason, an adherence which determines human behaviour.21 This connection 
made by Stair between reason and the divine will is a theme running through his 
Institutions and explains the blend of natural law and will ideas which gives his 
contract theory its peculiar ‘mixed’ quality.  
 Stair expounds a fundamental connection between our human nature, reason, 
and justice, stating that “there is an inclination to observe and follow these dictates [of 
reason], which is justice”.22 He cites in support of this view a passage of Ulpian from 
the Digest which states that justice is the unchangeable and continuous inclination to 
attribute to everyone his right.23 This leads Stair on to mentioning, although only in 
passing, the Aristotelian typology of justice24:  
 
“by the will, is not understood the faculty, but the inclination thereof, 
determined by the law, to give every one that which the law declareth to be 
due; and it is divided into distributive and commutative justice”.25  
 
The reference to Aristotelian ideas of justice is worth noting, as Stair has sometimes 
been  viewed simplistically as supporting a wholly will based theory of contract law. 
These remarks of Stair, at the very beginning of his Institutions (taken together with 
                                                 
18 Inst 1,1,1. See, in a similar vein, Richard Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593; reprinted 
frequently, incl Cambridge: CUP, 1989): “[t]he laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason.” 
(1.7.4) 
19 D M Walker, Introduction to the republished Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh and 
Yale: Edinburgh & Yale University Presses, 1981), p 25.  
20 Inst 1,1,1. 
21 Man is thus determined to be “humble, penitent, careful and diligent for the preservation of himself 
and his kind” (Inst 1,1,1). 
22 Inst 1,1,2. This view would be explicitly contradicted by David Hume in his writings: “The sense of 
justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature, but arises artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, 
and human conventions” (Hume, Treatise, 3.2.1.17). 
23 D.1.1.10. 
24 Nicomachean Ethics, Book V. 
25 Inst 1,1,2. 
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other passages noted below), support rather the idea of a blend in Stair’s thinking of 
Aristotle, reason and the will, albeit (as Lubbe has argued) that while 
 
“Stair discusses commutative justice, it, and the canonist notion of 
liberality, are not accorded a place in Stair’s exposition of the 
fundamental principles of natural law but take on rather subdued roles in 
the face of the apotheosis of a third scholastic virtue, that of promise-
keeping.”26 
 
Examination of other passages will essentially confirm the view that Stair, while 
integrating Aristotelian notion of justice, chooses to give primacy to man’s rational 
choices as commanding the respect of the law. This may be seen, for instance, in his 
discussion of so-called ‘permutative contracts’, where he prefers the parties’ 
estimations of the value of their respective performances to any external estimation of 
the justice of the exchange.27  
Stair’s preference for the will over external considerations of justice is 
explicable in part by his characterisation of the duty to fulfil voluntary engagements 
(such as contract) as one of the ‘first principles’ of equity.28 Stair’s three principles of 
equity – the obedience of man to God, the freedom of man to dispose of himself in so 
far as not restrained by this obedience, and the ability of man to restrict his freedom 
by binding himself to voluntary engagements – are used to set out the major, non-
Romanistic, division made by him between obediential and consensual obligations, 
or, as they are more usually called in the modern law, involuntary and voluntary 
obligations. The obedience man owes to God explains the basis, in Stair’s view, of 
obediential obligations, for they arise “not by [man’s] own consent or engagement, 
nor by the will of man, but by the will of God”.29 Obediential obligations include 
those of reparation (or in modern Scots terms, delict) and of restitution and 
recompense, and remuneration (in modern terms, unjustified enrichment and 
negotiorum gestio). On the other hand, the freedom of man, though it is often abused 
by him,30 is the origin of consensual obligations,31 among them contract and the 
separate obligation of promise.  
Stair’s treatment of consensual obligations, particularly contract, is interesting 
in its blend of natural law and will approaches. Contract is identified as entirely 
consistent with the natural law, Stair commenting that “there is nothing more natural, 
than to stand to the fruit of our pactions”,32 a reference likely being intended to a 
similarly expressed passage of Ulpian from the Digest.33 When Stair begins the 
detailed discussion of “Obligations Conventional, by Promise, Paction and 
Contract”34 in Book 1, Title 10, the stress is clearly upon contract as an exercise of the 
                                                 
26 G Lubbe, ‘Formation of Contract’ (cit at fn 6), at p 16. 
27 See Inst 1,10,14. 
28 Inst 1,1,18.  
29 Inst 1,1,19. 
30 Inst 1,1,20. 
31 Inst 1,1,20. 
32 Inst 1,1,21. 
33 D.2.14.1 (originally Ulpian, Edict, Book 4): “Huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. quid enim tam 
congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerent seruare?” translated by Alan Watson as 
“There is a natural equity in this edict. For what so accords with human faith as that which men have 
decided among themselves to observe?”.  
34 Some debate has arisen as to whether Stair meant, in the title of Title 10, to suggest a distinction 
between contract and paction. The generally accepted view is that, while some earlier writers (such as 
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will. Conventional obligations are stated as arising “from the will of man, whereby 
our own will tieth us in that, wherein God hath left us free”,35 and a little later as 
arising “from our will and consent”.36 That much is consistent with the common view 
of Stair as a supporter of will theory. But a further interesting, sometimes overlooked, 
passage from the introduction to Title 10 is also worth quoting in full: 
 
“[God] hath given that liberty in our power, that we may give it up to 
others, or restrain and engage it, whereby God obliges us to performance 
by mediation of our own will: yet such obligations, as to their original, 
are conventional, and not obediential.”37 
 
Why is this passage noteworthy? Because, while Stair begins by saying that our will 
may restrain or engage us, and that contracts are acts of the will, he continues by 
tying such acts of our will back to God’s will by saying that it is God who obliges us 
to perform contracts by the mediation [that is, the means] of our will. This perhaps 
seems, at first sight, rather odd. If contractual obligations are consensual, surely they 
should be seen as having binding force on account of our choice to enter into them? 
Not so, says Stair. They originate from our freely made choices, but they bind by 
virtue of their being an expression of the equitable principle of Man’s obedience to 
God, even if they are not obediential obligations so-called.  This makes sense if we 
remember Stair’s three principles of equity, mentioned above, which are (in order): 
the obedience of man to God, the freedom of man to dispose of himself in so far as 
not restrained by this obedience, and the ability of man to restrict his freedom by 
binding himself to voluntary engagements. The second and third of the principles 
follow on and flow from the first. Although man has freedom in those areas wherein 
he is not bound by God, if he chooses to give up that freedom and oblige himself, he 
is bound by virtue of the fact that obedience to such choices is essentially a form of 
derivative obedience to the will of God, who is the rational source of all law and thus 
of all obligations. Hence Stair can quite happily marry the idea that the ‘original’ 
(origin) of contracts is the will of man, with the idea that, having willed contractual 
obligations into being, man is then bound to obey them by virtue of the fact that it is 
God’s will that that they be honoured. This distinction between the source of contract, 
in Stair’s view, as lying in human choices and the exercise of human will, but the 
binding force of contract lying in the divine will that we honour our choices, is 
sometimes forgotten when Stair’s famous distinction between obediential and 
consensual obligations is discussed. A proper appreciation of this point reminds us of 
the fusion of natural law, reason and human will which is found in Stair’s conception 
of law.  
 Stair continues his discussion of human will by making a point which has 
been much repeated and applied by courts down the centuries: that not every act of 
human will binds the actor to a legal duty. On the contrary, Stair identifies three acts 
or stages of the will, namely desire, resolution and engagement.38 The distinction 
between these stages is readily appreciable, and easily applicable to common 
contractual cases. Thus, in a contract for the purchase of goods, the potential buyer 
                                                                                                                                            
Spottiswoode) may have intended such a distinction, Stair did not: see G Lubbe, ‘Formation of 
Contract’ (cit at fn 6), at p 10.  
35 Inst 1,10,1. 
36 Inst 1,10,1. 
37 Inst 1,10,1. 
38 Inst 1,10,2. 
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may form the desire to buy a particular good from seeing it displayed in a shop 
window. Having formed a desire to buy the good in question, he may resolve to act 
on that desire by stepping in to the shop and heading to the counter with the intention 
of purchasing the good. The final stage is reached when the buyer specifically 
requests to purchase the good and the shopkeeper agrees to sell it to him, both parties 
thereby engaging in the transaction. Desire, resolution and engagement thus easily 
match what we know from our own experience about many common contracts. The 
analytical distinction made by Stair in these three stages of the will has continued to 
be of use to the courts down to the modern era.39 It remains the case that something 
more than merely willing to contract is required: the will must be manifested 
externally by some act of engagement.  
 Stair continues by providing a definition of contract as based upon agreement, 
a consent to be bound to some act: “Pactum or a paction … is the consent of two or 
more parties, to some things to be performed by either of them; for it is not a consent 
in their opinions, but in their wills, to oblige any of them”. This definition proved 
fundamental for all subsequent Scots Law understanding of contracts, as it anchored 
the concept of contract in agreement, or consensus in idem (a Latin brocard to which 
Stair makes specific reference by citing the Digest40), a concept which has continued 
to be referred to by the courts down to the present age. Stair does not, as has often 
been the case in Common Law commentaries on contract, characterise contract as an 
exchange of promises. This idea of an exchange would have been unhelpful for Stair, 
as his treatment of contract sets out the Scottish rule that gratuitous contracts are as 
equally enforceable as onerous ones, there being no rule of mutual exchange or 
consideration in Scots Law.41 Gratuitous contracts makes perfect sense in a system in 
which the validity of the unilateral promise is also recognised.42 Agreement is of the 
essence of contract in Stair’s view, the bare pact (nudum pactum) being thus 
enforceable in Scots Law even though it had not been under Roman Law, a position 
Stair pithily summarises as meaning that “every paction produceth action.”43  
In stating his view that all contracts are enforceable, Stair refers to the 
‘common custom of nations’ for support and, importantly, also to the Canon Law. 
This is the first of a number of references to the Canon Law in his title on contract, 
such frequent references highlighting the influence exerted upon Stair by the Canonist 
position that promises seriously made should be honoured.44 In adopting this view, 
Stair was largely influenced by the Spanish Scholastic School.45 Apart from the 
Canon Law, in arguing that naked pactions and promises (he uses the latter term, for 
the most part, to mean the separate obligation of unilateral promise) are obligatory, 
Stair draws for support upon the law of nature, the Digest, Scripture, as well as 
commercial and mercantile considerations.46 Stair rejects the contrary views of 
                                                 
39 See the recent judicial use of Stair’s analysis in Cawdor v Cawdor 2007 SLT 152. 
40 D.2.14.1.2: “durorum pluriumve in idem placitum consensus atque conventio”.  
41 Inst 1,10,12. 
42 This is discussed further below. 
43 Inst 1,10,7. 
44 See further, on the influence of the Canon Law on Stair’s theory of contract and promise: D Sellar, 
‘Promise’, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (cit at fn 6), vol 
2, at p 262f; H L MacQueen and W D Sellar, ‘Scots Law: Ius quaesitum tertio, Promise and 
Irrevocability’, in Eltjo Schrage (ed) Ius Quaesitum Tertio (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008) 357, at 
p 361f. 
45 See, for instance, D M Walker’s discussion of Stair’s sources in the Introduction to the 1981 reprint 
of the Institutions (cit at fn 19). 
46 Inst 1,10,10. 
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Grotius,47 who required an acceptance before a unilateral promise might bind, and 
Connanus,48 who held to the view that only undertakings met with a reciprocal cause 
were enforceable. 
The acceptance of the validity of bare pacts, gratuitous contracts, and 
unilateral contracts, under Stair’s direction, was to provide Scots Law with a very 
flexible and broad law of voluntary obligations. As remarked upon below, the 
unilateral promise in particular fits very well with the nature of many common 
transactions which are only with some difficulty forced by the Common Law into the 
straitjacket of bilateral contracts. Acceptance of the validity of promises also provided 
Stair with the means by which to characterise the third party right (jus quaesitum 
tertio), which he sees clearly as a species of “promise, though gratuitous, made in 
favour of a third party”.49 This early recognition in Scots Law of third party rights (by 
contrast with English Law’s general acceptance of such only as recently as 1999) 
provided a simple and effective way of categorising and recognising the validity of a 
commonly encountered transaction. 
What may one conclude of Stair’s approach to contract law, and in particular 
the ground which he laid for later writers? First, he saw no fundamental division in 
law between reason, nature and the divine will, law being rather a fusion of them all. 
Second, his obligational framework and theory saw a place for justice, as embodied in 
the natural law and Christian morality, but ultimately subjected it to the value of 
honouring agreements and promises seriously made. As such, there was a melding of 
Aristotelian and will approaches, but with the will given pre-eminence. Third, his 
framework distinguished consensual and obediential obligations, the former having 
their source in acts of the human will, while recognising that the binding force of both 
was due to the obedience due by man to God. Fourth, the Canon law’s favouring of 
promises allowed Stair to recognise the enforcement of gratuitous contracts, unilateral 
promises, and third party rights. This provided Scots law with a territory of voluntary 
obligations much wider than that of the Common Law.  
The genius of Stair’s scheme set a mould for Scots Law from which later 
writers and the courts were loathe to depart, even if his theory of contract law as 
based upon reason, human will, and the moral importance of adhering to voluntary 
engagements, came gradually to be sheared of its natural law element. This 
development of Stair’s theory by later writers is now explored. 
 
(c)  The development of contract theory after Stair 
 
The history of contract theory after Stair may be neatly summed up as one of respect 
for Stair’s classification of obligations, but with a gradual dissipation of the natural 
law element to leave a contract theory based upon a simple emphasis on the human 
will as the source of voluntary obligations.  
At first, natural law thinking continued. Stair was followed by another 
Institutional writer, Andrew MacDowall (Lord Bankton), whose major contribution to 
the law was his Institute of the Laws of Scotland (the first volume being published in 
1751). Following Stair, Bankton stresses man’s nature as a rational being, and law as 
embodying that which is “just, right and good”.50 Where the law does not command 
                                                 
47 Inst 1,10,4. 
48 Inst 1,10,10. 
49 Inst I,10,5. 
50 Inst 1,1,1. 
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or forbid, Bankton states that the “freedom of man’s will”51 is paramount. Bankton is 
however far from being entirely a rationalist, of the Humean School; on the contrary, 
like Stair, he has an extensive discussion of the law of nature.52 Bankton also 
discusses the Aristotelian division between commutative and distributive justice,53 
although there is no specific citation of the Aristotelian source of this classification. 
Bankton equates commutative justice with the law of contract: “[c]ommutative justice 
is that which is incident to contract and mutual intercourse of negotiations among 
man.”54 While at one point he seems to suggest that an equality in contractual 
performance must be observed,55 elsewhere he specifically rejects the idea that a 
failure to observe the precepts of this species of justice gives rise to any actionable 
claim at law, thus elevating the human will over external criteria for judging 
contractual justice.56  
Like Stair, Bankton says that conventional obligations arise “from the will of 
the parties”57. He also adopts the view that contract is based upon agreement.58 
Bankton thus began a pattern of acceptance of Stair’s ideas and legal structure which 
was to be continued by later writers. What is distinctive about Bankton is that he 
follows each of the subject headings of his work with a discussion of the English law 
on the same subject. For instance, he discusses the structure of the English law of 
obligations, saying that obligations in England “may be divided into such as arise 
from contract, or quasi contract; or from a delinquency and crime, or a quasi 
delinquency, as they are termed in the civil law.”59 This may have been rather 
generous to the English taxonomy of the time. One suspects that Bankton may have 
been projecting on to the contemporary English Law a civilian structure which he 
thought it ought to have rather than one which it self consciously saw itself as 
possessing. One can only really confidently assert the beginnings of a proper concept 
of a law of obligations in English Law with the judgments of Lord Mansfield, 
appointed as a judge in 1756, some five years after Bankton’s first volume 
appeared.60 
                                                 
51 Inst 1,1,1. 
52 Inst 1,1,18 – 1,1,28. Like Stair, he sees nature and reason as intimately entwined: “This original [i.e. 
natural] law is frequently termed the law or dictate of reason, because by the use of reason, duly 
improv’d, the laws of nature may be discovered.” (Inst 1,1,24.) 
53 Inst 1,1,7. 
54 Inst 1,1,8. 
55 Bankton states that commutative justice means that “an equality must be observed in our contracts, 
and we must perform the terms of our contracts … without distinction”. (Inst 1,1,10) 
56 Inst 1,4,12.  
57 Inst 1,11. 
58 Inst 1,11,1. Bankton states rather oddly that contract is the agreement of “one or more persons”, in 
contrast to the usual understanding, pace Stair, that contractual agreement requires the consent of two 
or more persons to be bound at law. One must conclude that Bankton had in mind to include gratuitous 
contracts, where only one party comes under any onerous duty, but the reference to the agreement of a 
sole party expresses that idea rather clumsily, as even in gratuitous contracts the recipient of the benefit 
must at the very least accept the offer in his favour and hence agree to what is offered.   
59 Inst 1,4,19. 
60 The seed planted by Lord Mansfield did not always find receptive soil. On the one hand, in the third 
edition of Chitty’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts (London: S Sweet, 1841), it was still 
being asserted that “English lawyers generally use the word obligation, in reference to … only a 
particular species of Contracts, that is, Bonds” (p 1). By contrast, one may note Colebrooke’s Treatise 
on Obligations and Contracts (1818, cit at fn 1), which contains a detailed discussion of obligations, 
and their various characteristics, with citation of the Digest, Pothier, as well as Erskine; S M Leake’s 
The Elements of the Law of Contracts (1867, cit at fn 1), containing an introduction setting contract 
within the wider obligational framework; and, Anson’s Principles of the English Law of Contract 
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 A rough contemporary of Bankton was Henry Hume (Lord Kames), the last 
major Scots jurist who may be described as a natural lawyer. A specific concern of 
Kames was to refute the theory of the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David 
Hume that justice is an entirely human creation and that there is no such thing as the 
natural law. In Kames’s work, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Religion, first published in 1751 (the same year as Bankton’s first volume), he 
discusses and then flatly rejects Hume’s view, expounded in his Treatise of Human 
Nature,61 that “[t]he sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature, but arises 
artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human conventions.”62 Kames gave a 
similar defence of man’s natural intuition (his ‘moral sense or conscience’) of right 
and wrong in his later Principles of Equity.63 Kames grounds both contract and 
promise in the natural law, saying they “hath also a solid foundation in human 
nature.”64 He refutes Hume’s view that promises have neither moral value nor are 
intelligible to human beings without having been established by human convention. 
On the contrary, says Kames, promises and contracts are based upon our very human 
nature: “mutual trust and confidence, without which there can be no useful society, 
enter into the character of the human species.” Thus, even though a promise made to 
someone might not be enforceable by anyone after that person’s death, the promissor 
would suffer “reproach and blame” if he neglected to do that which he had 
promised.65 
Corresponding to mutual trust and confidence are the principles of veracity and 
fidelity, without which the world would be overrun with fraud and deceit. Kames 
asserts that 
 
“The performance of a deliberate promise has, in all ages, been considered 
as a duty. We have that sense of a promise, as what we are strictly bound 
to perform; and the breach of promise is attended with the same natural 
stings which attend other crimes, namely remorse, and a sense of merited 
punishment.”66 
 
Having grounded promise in human nature, and explained the consequences of 
breach of promise, he adds an interesting remark on the source of a promise’s 
obligational force:  
 
“Were there by nature no trust nor reliance upon promises, breach of 
promise would be a matter of indifferency. The reliance upon us, produced 
by our own act, constitutes the obligation. We feel ourselves bound to 
perform; we consider it as our duty.”67 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(1879, cit at fn 1), which includes discussion (at pp 6-8) of the ‘various modes’ by which obligations 
originate, including from agreement, delict, quasi-contract, and breach of contract. 
61 First published in 1739. 
62 Hume, Treatise, 3.2.1.17, p 311 
63 Principles of Equity (Edinburgh: Kincaid & Bell, 1767, 2nd ed), pp 1-5. See also, for instance, pp 8 – 
9: “That there is in mankind a common sense of what is right and wrong, and an uniformity of opinion, 
is a matter of fact, of which the only infallible proof is observation and experience”. 
64 Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh: J Bell, 1779, 3rd ed), p 75. 
65 Principles of Equity, p 16. 
66 Essays, p 77. 
67 Essays, p 78. 
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This is noteworthy as it seems to support a view of promise remarkably similar 
to that of reliance theorists. It is not a typical approach for a natural lawyer. Although 
Kames has been defending natural law theory, he does not here ground the 
obligational force of promise (or contract) in the duty of obedience we owe to God, 
and hence derivatively to others, as Stair would have it, but rather in the effect a 
promise has upon the party to whom it is made. This, it might be said, is a weaker 
argument for the force of promises, in that it could be said to exclude from the 
category of valid promises one which has yet to be relied upon because, for instance, 
the promisee has yet to hear of it or, even having heard of it, has yet to take any 
course of action which might cause him detriment were the promise to be avoided.  
 Kames’s defence of promises and contracts, as binding primarily because they 
are expressions of fidelity which give rise to reliance is an unusual, from a Scottish 
perspective, justification of consensual obligations. It is not a reason advanced by 
other jurists writing specifically on Scots Law, although intention to create reliance, 
or knowledge of likely reliance, is crucial to the general theory of promises advanced 
by MacCormick.68 When considering Kames’s advancement of the importance of 
reliance it should be remembered that this is but one a number of reasons advanced by 
him for the force of promises.  
 The other notable jurists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century have 
little to offer on contract theory. John Erskine, in his Institute of the Law of Scotland 
published in 1773, has almost nothing on the theory of contract.69 George Bell makes 
equally scant mention of contract theory in his Commentaries.70 Indeed, by the end of 
the eighteenth century, when the age of Enlightenment ideas was giving way to the 
age of Commerce, Scots contractual theory seems essentially to have gone into 
abeyance. The impression one gets is that Stair’s view was so soundly entrenched and 
universally accepted that there was perceived to be no need to engage in any further 
theoretical debate. The priority for writers and the courts had come to lie in the 
practice of the law and the development of specific legal rules. 
  Practicality, rather than theory, was largely also the pattern in the twentieth 
century, with one notable exception. Thus, while in William Gloag’s important work, 
The Law of Contract,71 there are a number of issues of interest for a theory of 
contract, they are addressed not in any general philosophical way such as one might 
find in Stair or Kames, but rather through the author’s treatment of a number of 
practical contractual issues which arose largely as a result of nineteenth century 
mercantile case law.72 Gloag explains that a “contractual obligation must have as its 
basis the agreement of the parties”, and provides citation from Pothier’s Treatise on 
Obligations,73 Stair, Erskine and Bell. Pothier is cited frequently in Gloag’s work, as 
                                                 
68 N MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (cit at fn 5), ch 10, especially at pp 202-3.  
69 His view that “[c]onsensual contracts are those, which, by Roman Law, might be perfected by 
consent alone, without the intervention either of things or of writing” both fails to express the proper 
breadth of contract in Scots Law as well as to mention the unenforceability in Roman Law of the very 
bare pact (nudum pactum) which he cites. 
70 He simply follows Stair and Bankton in noting that contract is an act of the human will and has its 
obligatory force for that reason: Commentaries (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1870, 7th ed), III.1. 
71 Cit at fn 2. 
72 For instance, the issue of whether an agreement which may have been intended by the parties to be 
enforceable, but in terms of which neither has any ‘patrimonial interest’ (which Gloag describes as a 
“right to property, or a right to use the property”), is one which the courts will enforce contractually: 
see Gloag,  p 9. 
73 Pothier, 1.3: “A contract is a kind of agreement … An agreement or a pact (for these are synonymous 
expressions is the assent of two or more persons, to form an engagement between them, or to dissolve 
or modify one already formed.” The translation is that from the 1802 English edition published by 
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it features also in English writing and judgments of the period.74 From an Anglophile 
such as Gloag, it is not surprising that one also finds a further definition of the nature 
of agreement from English Law, that of Sir Frederick Pollock.75 In the later twentieth 
century, W W McBryde, in the pre-eminent current treatise of contract law, took a 
similarly practical approach, confining his few remarks on theory to pointing out that 
while Anglo-American Law concentrates on the idea of an exchange of promises, 
Scots Law has been characterised by stressing contract as a voluntarily constituted 
species of obligation along with the separate obligation of promise. 
 In the twentieth century, the name of Sir T B Smith stands out as having made 
the only notable contribution to the theory of contract. Smith was concerned 
(somewhat simplistically in the view of some) to promote the principled, civilian 
nature of Scots Law and its legal system, in opposition to what he saw as the 
overbearing influence of an unprincipled, alien Common Law. Smith’s view of 
contract, and its wider place within the law of obligations, may be gleaned from his 
many articles, his Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland76 and his Studies 
Critical and Comparative.77 Smith was firmly of the view that the origins of the Scots 
law of obligations were civilian, both in terms of pure Roman sources and of the 
received law of the ius commune mediated through Continental jurists and the Canon 
Law.78 English Law had later come to influence Scots Law, largely to its detriment, 
but this did not detract from the fact that Scots Law retained distinctive answers to 
some fundamental contractual questions: the doctrine of mutual consideration was 
rejected;79 unilateral promises (or pollicatations as Smith frequently calls them)80 
were enforceable, as was a jus quaesitum tertio;81 there was a distinctive and superior 
answer to the question of contractual error.82  A role for the concept of bona fides 
was, contra English Law, to be welcomed. The sum of his writings on these important 
matters of contractual principle constitutes a legacy which, while not always followed 
by the courts, “continues to be used in teaching and academic legal research.”83  
Smith is noteworthy in asserting – it seems, the first Scots writer clearly to do 
so in these precise terms – that obligations can not only be classified according to 
whether they arise obedientially or voluntarily, but also according to their position in 
a hierarchy by which they should be accorded precedence. He posits the hierarchy as 
being (in order of precedence): (1) obligations founded on statute or an express rule of 
law based on public policy, i.e. ex lege; (2) those founded on fault, i.e. arising under 
reparation or delict; and (3) those founded on the will of the obligants, as in contract. 
                                                                                                                                            
Martin & Ogden (Newburn, North Carolina). Gloag quotes a portion of this passage in almost precisely 
the same terms, except for substituting ‘rescind’ for ‘dissolve’. 
74 For a discussion of the influence of Pothier’s will theory of contract in the development of English 
contract law, see D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford: OUP,  
1999), p 221 f. 
75 Gloag, p 6. 
76 Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 1962. 
77 Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 1962. 
78 “The Scottish law of obligations and moveable property is basically Romanistic” Studies Critical, p 
xiv. 
79 See Studies Critical at p xiv.  
80 See discussion in Studies Critical at pp 168 – 182. There has been a not inconsiderable debate among 
Scottish writers as to whether promise may be equated with the Roman pollicitatio.  
81 See Studies Critical at pp 183 – 197.  
82 See Studies Critical at pp 99 – 100, and Short Commentary at p 808 f. 
83 See H L MacQueen, ‘Glory with Gloag or to the stake with Stair?’, in E Reid and D Carey Miller 
(eds), A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the progress of Scots Law (Edinburgh: EUP,  
2005), at p 166.  
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Asserting the existence of such a hierarchy enables Smith to explain why, for 
instance, liability on the part of A to a third party C might exist in delict even though 
A had successfully restricted his liability to B in contract, the reason being that the 
liability to C “is owed under a more fundamental and general principle.”84 It would be 
another thirty years before English Law would be sufficiently released from its 
straitjacket of privity to allow such an idea to flourish, so that Lord Lloyd could talk 
comfortably, in an English legal context, of tort as “the general law, out of which the 
parties may, if they can, contract”.85 For Smith, such liability to a third party, and 
indeed the idea of concurrent liability in general, was far from a radical development 
of the law: it flowed from an understanding of the relative importance of different 
obligations within a unified law of obligations. The concept of such a hierarchy, 
although it is not as widely appreciated as it should be, is indeed a useful one, and can 
be used to explain a number of rules, and the answer to a number of questions, within 
the law of obligations.86 
Not all of Smith’s conceptual discussion is helpful. He was, for instance, 
largely responsible for the promotion of the idea that a category of ‘unilateral 
contract’ exists within Scots law. I have argued elsewhere that the term ‘unilateral’ 
should be confined to describing obligations which require the participation of only 
one party in order to be constituted. So defined, promise alone can be unilateral in 
Scots terms; contract cannot, as it always requires the participation of two parties to 
constitute the obligation. If what is intended is a distinction between obligations 
where only one party comes under any duty of performance, the term gratuitous is 
preferable.87 On that definition, both contract and promise may be gratuitous. 
 
(d)  Conclusion on the structure of obligations and the development of contract 
theory 
 
Beginning with Stair, a distinctively Scottish view of contract law was developed by 
Scots writers, the key characteristics of which are as follows: 
 
(i) Contract was seen as one obligation within a coherent and unified law of 
obligations, an obligation being a legal tie by which a party or parties are bound 
to a specified performance. In seeing contract in this way, Scots Law was 
drawing upon its civilian heritage. Whilst nineteenth century Common Law 
literature plainly also recognises a law of obligations, this conceptualisation is a 
later development, and was to remain incomplete until a general acceptance of 
unjustified enrichment at the very end of the twentieth century.88 
                                                 
84 Studies Critical, p 76. 
85 Lord Lloyd in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1995] 3 All ER 307 at 315h-j.  
86 See further Hogg, at 1.75 – 1.79, 3.19 – 3.20.  
87 As with the meaning of unilateral, there is however an academic controversy concerning the idea of 
an obligation being gratuitous: does it mean an undertaking given without the ability to compel a 
counter performance, or does it mean merely one given without the expectation of receiving such a 
counter performance? On this point, see Hogg, at 1.16 – 1.17, 2.06 – 2.11. There is also controversy as 
to whether it is possible for an obligation to change character after its formation, along the lines of the 
English view that a unilateral contract can somehow morph into a synallagmatic one: see, for instance, 
Lord Diplock’s speech in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444 suggesting that 
this may occur. 
88 As noted earlier, some Common Lawyers continue remarkably to oppose unjustified enrichment 
being recognised within the law (see for instance, S Hedley, ‘‘Unjust Enrichment’: The Same Old 
Mistake?’, cit at fn 13). 
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(ii) Stair set the mould for explaining the nature of contract (and indeed the other 
obligations). Contract arose from the acts of will of two or more parties to be 
bound at law to some engagement. Contract thus arose by consent. However, as 
explained above, in Stair’s view all obligations ultimately derive their force 
from the duty of obedience that man owes to God.  
(iii) Stair recognised, as a natural lawyer, the requirements of justice, made plain to 
man both through his observations of the natural world and as revealed through 
Scripture. The dictates of justice were expressed in the rational discipline of law. 
So far as consensual obligations were concerned, justice was determined by 
what was voluntarily agreed by men as free and rational beings. Thus the will 
was given primacy over any external determination of the just ordering of 
voluntary obligations. This was supported by the value of adhering to promises, 
a virtue recognised by the Canon Law. In Stair, the natural law is welded to the 
human will, with the latter being determinative of the nature and content of the 
obligation. 
(iv) Because of the prominence given to the virtue of adhering to promises, 
unilateral promises and promises made in favour of third parties were to be 
given legal effect. In addition, the bare pact, unsupported by writing or by 
mutual consideration, was also to be enforced (with some exceptions made for 
specific circumstances requiring writing).  
(v) Stair’s approach was followed by later writers who saw the origin of voluntary 
obligations as lying in an act of will of the parties. Kames’s arguments present 
an interesting deviation in support of reliance theory, but this reasoning seems 
not to have been adopted by other writers. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, little further conceptualising of contract was engaged in by Scots 
writers. T B Smith provides a notable exception however, one of his important 
contributions to theory being the notion of a hierarchy of obligations. 
 
The totality of this development by Scots writers produced a law of contract which 
had a clearly defined role within a wider law of obligations, was broad in nature (with 
no requirement of mutual consideration, and recognising a jus quaesitum tertio), and 
which essentially conceived of contract as an obligation deriving its existence from 
the manifested acts of will of the parties. It was a law of contract based upon a 
fundamental single principle, pacta sunt servanda, a principled approach absent in the 
Common Law. Eventually, as the eighteenth century progressed, Stair’s overlaying of 
contract theory with the religious and natural law superstructure of his day withered 
away, but his division of obligations into voluntary and involuntary types was one 
which continued to be followed by the vast majority of commentators. 
 In the following section of this paper, an outline is given of some distinctive 
features of the modern Scots contract law which, it is suggested, are attributable to the 
distinctive history described above.   
 
3. Distinctive features of modern contract theory  
 
The foregoing discussion has suggested that Scots contract theory was established by 
Stair as a mixture of natural law and rationalism. A further characterisation of the 
nature of such contract theory as mixed can also be said to lie in the fact that the 
principles of modern contract law are derived both from the Common Law and from 
Romano-Civilian systems. Thus, the lack of a doctrine of mutual consideration, the 
existence of irrevocable (or firm) offers, and performance as the creditor’s primary 
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right, are all examples of contractual rules having a civilian origin; a unified concept 
of breach, repudiation as breach, and self-help remedies for non-performance, are all 
aspects of the Common Law influence.89 Two different types of mixture thus 
characterise the law.   
 A number of specific features of the modern law merit further development. 
 
(a)  Ideas of ‘agreement’ and ‘promise’ in  the characterisation of contract. 
One noteworthy feature of the modern law is the continued importance placed 
by the law upon the value of honouring a pledged performance. The value of so doing 
can be traced back to Stair’s emphasis upon keeping promises (in the wide sense of 
that term) which he derived from natural law, Canon Law, and Scripture. This 
importance of honouring what one has pledged is recognised in the modern law both 
through the way in which contract is characterised as well as through the continued 
existence of a separate obligation of unilateral promise, the existence of the latter 
obligation affecting the characterisation of the former. 
In terms of the characterisation of contract, a pledged contractual performance 
must be honoured because it is said to be an objectively manifested act of the human 
will, usually analysed by the courts through the language of ‘agreement’. The courts 
have continually recognised contract as deriving its force from the agreement of 
parties having the capacity to contract, on all the essentials required at law. 
Agreement is concluded when the parties reach (as Stair, quoting from the Digest, put 
it) consensus in idem.90 Judicial statements to this effect are commonplace. One may 
note, for instance, Lord Blackburn’s observation in Walker v Alexander Hall & Co 
Ltd91 of the crucial feature of the case before him that “there was no consensus in 
idem between the parties”. More recently, one finds Lord Penrose remarking in Elcap 
v Milne’s Executor92 that “[t]he pursuers’ averments are not apt to support contract. 
There is no reference to consensus”. In another decision, the Inner House remarked 
that “[t]here is no doubt that parties must achieve consensus in idem upon all the 
essential matters before there can be said to be a contract between them.”93 
A bare agreement, even one complete in its terms, does not however have the 
force of law: the parties must in addition intend to be bound at law.94 Such an 
intention was absent, for instance, in the facts of Karoulias (WS) v The Drambuie 
Liqueur Co Ltd,95 where the court took the view that the parties had intended a signed 
written agreement before they considered themselves bound at law. In his judgment, 
Lord Clarke remarked that: 
 
                                                 
89 See further on this sense of the mixed nature of Scots contract law, H L MacQueen, Scots Law and 
the Road to the New Ius Commune, Ius Commune Lectures on European Private Law (Maastricht: 
METRO Institute, 2000; also published online as (2000) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 4(4)). 
90 See, for instance, the following: Seed Shipping Co v Kelvin Shipping Co (1924) 17 Ll L Rep. 170; 
Pickard v Ritchie 1986 SLT 466; Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd  v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd 1996 
SLT 604; “contract is an agreement”: Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland 
[2005] UKHL 73, 2006 SC (HL) 1, at para 109; Advice Centre for Mortgages Ltd v McNicoll 2006 
SLT 591.  
91 (1919) 1 Ll L Rep 661. 
92 1999 SLT 58. 
93 Avintair Ltd v Ryder Airline Services Ltd 1994 SC 270, at 273. 
94 Thus Lord Prosser noted the importance of “consensus and an intention to conclude a contract”: 
Dawson International plc v Coats Paton plc (No 2) 1993 SLT 80. 
95 [2005] CSOH 112, 2005 SLT 813, 2005 SCLR 1014. 
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“while there may be complete agreement between parties, in the sense of 
negotiations being over, there may not yet necessarily be a binding 
agreement.”96 
 
Referring to the earlier decision of the House of Lords in Comex Houlder Driving Ltd 
v Colme Fishing Co,97 Lord Clarke emphasised that what is crucial is discerning 
‘mutual assent’ by the parties to be bound at law. This puts the issue in modern terms, 
but the core idea goes back to Stair’s requirement that an act of will be manifested 
externally before contractual engagement can be said to be demonstrated. Indeed, the 
courts occasionally still make direct use of Stair’s analysis of the three stages of the 
will when deciding whether or not a party has reached the stage of intending a binding 
obligation, as may be seen from the citation of Stair’s analysis by the court in the 
promissory case of Cawdor v Cawdor.98 Manifested assent is, as in the Common Law, 
judged objectively, a point usually emphasised by reference to the famous dictum of 
Lord President Dunedin in Muirhead & Turnbull v Dickson that “commercial 
contracts cannot be arranged by what people think in their inmost minds. Commercial 
contracts are made according to what people say.”99 This professedly objective 
approach to analysing agreement has, however, not been theoretically developed 
much beyond this rather trite remark.100 Some argue that an objective approach to 
contract formation presents a problem for will theory, because it undermines the idea 
that it is an actual meeting of the minds of the parties which is crucial. This is a 
somewhat shallow criticism, however. All instances of the will, at whichever of 
Stair’s stages of desire, resolution, or engagement, and in relation to whichever type 
of matter (whether contract or some other form of human transaction), can only ever 
be judged by some action or behaviour which is manifested to the world outside of the 
actor in question. Indeed, the very fact that it is engagement, in Stair’s terms, which is 
the crucial stage of the three stages of will for contractual formation, is surely 
suggestive of a process which must inevitably require to be judged from a perspective 
outside that of the mind of the party in question.  
The existence of a separate obligation of promise doubtless influences a 
preference for the language of agreement when characterising the nature of contract 
rather than the oft encountered Common Law characterisation of contract as an 
‘exchange of promises’,101 although it is worth recalling that the enforceable right of a 
third party under a contract is usually still characterised in the modern law in 
promissory terms (in the narrow Scots Law sense), as it was by Stair.102 This does not 
detract from the idea of contract as an agreement, but merely recognises that parties 
                                                 
96 Para 50 of Lord Clarke’s judgment. 
97 1987 SC (HL) 85. 
98 2007 SLT 152. 
99 (1905) 7 F 686, at 694. 
100 See however some discussion in M Hogg and G Lubbe, ‘Formation of Contract’ in R Zimmermann 
and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (Oxford: OUP, 2004). I also consider the matter to some degree in Hogg, 
paras 1.47 – 1.53. Undeveloped in Scots theory is, for instance, the issue of what type of objectivity -  
what have been termed ‘promissor’, ‘promisee’, or ‘detached’/‘fly on the wall’ by Common Lawyers - 
is favoured by the courts. For views on the alleged different types of objectivity in English Law, see W 
Howarth, ‘The Meaning of Objectivity in Contract’ (1984) 100 LQR 265 – 281 and J P Vorster ‘A 
Comment on the Meaning of Objectivity in Contract’ (1987) 103 LQR 274 – 287. 
101 Even though such an analysis of contract might have found some support from Stair’s remark (at 
Inst 1, 10,5) that “[p]romises dependent upon acceptance may … be made by way of offer”. 
102 Inst I,10,5. 
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may include within their agreement a unilateral, promissory undertaking in favour of 
a non-contracting party.  
A further consequence of the existence of a separate obligation of promise is 
that one finds that the Scottish courts generally do not seek to force commercial or 
private transactions which have a unilateral characteristic into the straitjacket of 
contract law, as English Law sometimes does under the guise of so-called ‘unilateral 
contracts’. Rather, a transaction which has the nature of a unilateral undertaking will 
(usually) be characterised as a promise. For example, undertakings given by parties 
when inviting offers are naturally analysed as promises. Thus, the undertakings 
viewed by the English court in both Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of 
Canada103 and Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council104 as 
unilateral contracts would have been regarded in Scotland as instances of a promise, 
in Harvela to sell to the highest bidder and in Blackpool to consider all tenders 
submitted timeously.105 In like fashion, undertakings to keep offers open for 
acceptance for a stated period of time are regarded in Scotland as binding promises, 
and there is no need to search for some elusive consideration in order to enforce the 
undertaking as a separate contract. Options contained within contracts, such as 
reversionary options to allow a seller of property the right to repurchase it, or options 
to purchase given to lessees, are also often regarded as promises.106 Offers of reward 
would also, most naturally be classed as promises in Scotland, although in this 
particular instance one does find, under English influence, that the reported cases have 
followed the Common Law approach of regarding them as offers made to the 
world.107 Other common examples of things which may be analysed as promises in 
Scotland include certain types of negotiable instrument, cheque guarantee cards, 
guarantees issued by manufacturers of goods to the ultimate consumer, and I.O.U.s.108 
Promise is thus able to provide the most appropriate legal framework for many 
commercial unilateral undertakings, and indeed for some private transactions too 
(although for non-commercial transactions, the requirement of a subscribed document 
acts as a limitation on its utility109). 
 A third way in which the existence of a separate obligation of promise has 
influenced contract law is as a disincentive for the law to develop a doctrine of 
                                                 
103 [1986] AC 207. 
104 [1990] 3 All ER 25. 
105 Although the difficulty with the Blackpool case would have been that the defendant had only 
expressly undertaken not to consider late tenders: the undertaking to consider timeously submitted 
tenders had to be inferred. Inferring a promise in Scots Law is a difficult matter, as promissory 
statements are usually construed strictly according to the precise form of words used.  
106 See, for instance, Stone v Macdonald 1979 SC 363, 1979 SLT 288. Alternatively some cases have 
seen such options as examples of ‘firm offers’, i.e. offers with a promise that the option will be granted 
if the offeree indicates a desire to do so: Hamilton v Lochrane (1899) 1 F 478. The drawback with the 
latter analysis is that the acceptance of the option might have to be in a specific form (if, for instance, 
the offer related to land), whereas the notification that a promissor option is being exercised needs no 
particular form (as the court concluded in Stone v Macdonald) Options are classed as unilateral 
contracts under English Law: see Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444. 
107 Hunter v General Accident Corporation 1909 SC 344, 1908 SLT 656 and Hunter v Hunter (1904) 7 
F 136. Adoption of the English approach may make practical sense, given that many such offers of 
reward are made in a private context and would thus require (by virtue of the terms of the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995) to be in subscribed writing in order for them to be valid.  
108 See further Hogg, 2.84. 
109 Non-business promises must be constituted in a document subscribed by the granter, or in a digitally  
signed electronic document: Requirements of Writing(Scotland) Act 1995, s1(2),(2A). 
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promissory estoppel such as is found in Common Law jurisdictions.110 Because 
promises undertaken in a business context do not require to be constituted in any 
particular form, and can thus be made orally,111 circumstances which in English law 
would require a court to prevent a party withdrawing from a commercial undertaking 
by virtue of the doctrine of promissory estoppel can instead be explained either as 
contractual in nature (no mutual consideration being required before a contract can be 
constituted) or else as demonstrating the presence of an enforceable promise.  Thus, a 
statement that a party waives a contractual right can in Scotland be described as a 
promise. 
 
(b) The will-based theory of contract law 
The discussion in the previous section indicates that the discernment of an intention 
by the parties to be bound at law to an agreement remains pre-eminent in modern 
contractual thinking. Such thinking locates modern Scots theory within the will based 
camp of contract theory, an approach laid out by Stair in his characterisation of 
contract not simply in natural law, but also rational, will-based, terms. Such thinking 
is so entrenched in Scots contract theory that one finds almost no support, academic 
or judicial, in modern Scots Law for any competing contract theories, such as the 
reliance, transfer or relational theories commonly discussed in Common Law works 
on contract theory. 
Given the continued pre-eminence of opinion in favour of will theory in Scots 
Law, it is interesting to ask whether the Scots obligational framework and the 
historical development outlined earlier make the defence of will theory any easier 
than in the Common Law. I want to suggest that the defence of will theory in Scots 
contract law is somewhat easier (although not all of the challenges usually mounted 
against will theory can be easily repelled within a Scottish theoretical context), and 
that this is so for four principal reasons. 
Firstly, avoidance in modern Scots Law of the use of the idea of promise to 
explain the nature of contract means that the charge that it is inappropriate to use the 
idea of promise to explain contract (given that promise is a unilateral act whereas 
contract is bilateral) is evidently irrelevant. Scots law does indeed confine the 
language of promise to unilateral acts. This is so even in the one case where 
promissory language is used in a contractual context, namely to describe the nature of 
a jus quaesitum tertio in contract, because both of the contracting parties can be seen 
as making separate unilateral promises to the third party.  So, given the absence of 
promissory language to describe the nature of contract in Scots Law, this first 
common objection to will theory is easier to dismiss than in the Common Law. 
Secondly, as the history of contractual theory in Scots Law described above 
indicates, the origin of will theory can be traced to Stair’s idea of law as the dictate of 
reason, and contract as an expression of the rational will. Its source is not much later, 
nineteenth century, mercantile free trade ideas, even if such ideas reinforced Stair’s 
approach. Given this history, attacks on will theory which argue that such free trade 
ideology is outdated as a basis for explaining  the underlying force of contracts have 
much less force. Admittedly, an alternative charge might be put that, if nineteenth 
century laissez-faire ideas are outmoded so far as contract theory is concerned, how 
much more so even more ancient, seventeenth century thinking. It might, however, be 
                                                 
110 Although Scots Law does have a developed doctrine of personal bar which operates in a number of 
different instances within the law: see J Blackie and E Reid, Personal Bar (Edinburgh: W Green, 
2006).  
111 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s1(2)(a)(ii).  
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rejoindered to such a charge that, unless we are to accept that ideas of honesty and 
fidelity which underpinned the thinking of Stair and those who followed him are 
somehow outdated, the moral imperative of performing what one has pledged to do is 
no less relevant for the modern era. Indeed, the fundamental importance of reasserting 
the idea of voluntary acceptance as a reason for enforcing obligations may perhaps be 
even greater in an era when modern psychology and sociology have blunted ideas of 
personal responsibility for individual actions. While it may be argued by some that the 
modern actor cannot be held accountable for his or her behaviour because the idea of 
free will (and thus responsibility) has been destroyed by post-modernist thinking, the 
advocate of the will theory of contract might reply that such post-modern notions are 
undermining the functioning of human society and need urgently to be countered by a 
re-emphasis upon the importance of enforcing voluntarily accepted duties.   
Thirdly, it can be argued that will theory is more easily supported in Scots law 
because of the importance placed upon performance remedies (specific implement is 
the primary remedy in Scots Law, rather than damages), so Scots contract law can 
withstand the criticism that contracts are really only about making reparation for 
breach (as reliance theorists like Atiyah have argued112). 
Lastly, Scots law’s lack of a doctrine of mutual consideration means it is 
immune from any arguments that consideration undermines a will based approach 
because the law is actually about putting things in the correct form rather than 
enforcing the will of the parties. In a system with no mutual consideration 
requirement, the emphasis can be argued much more naturally to lie in enforcement of 
the will of the parties.  
The peculiar history and nature of Scots contract theory does then make 
defence of will theory easier in relation to some of the common charges levelled 
against it. On the other hand, that peculiar nature cannot answer all the common 
charges against will theory. The problem of implied terms is not, for instance, tackled 
any more easily within a Scottish theoretical context. The charge is that many terms 
are implied without any reference to the will of the parties but rather, as one theory 
alleges, to give effect to Aristotelian virtues, such as justice and good faith.113 There 
is no peculiarly Scottish response to this, although one consistent with the theory of 
contract law outlined above would be to point out that support for a will theory of 
contract need not entail the view that the entire content of a contract derives from the 
will of the parties. A defence of will theory need only entail that the process of 
formation of a contract depends upon the will of the parties, without the necessity of 
arguing that all of its terms do. In an age of increasing state regulation of private 
relationships, some of the content of contracts will inevitably be comprised of terms 
implied by courts, either under statute, or else at common law with regard to 
considerations other than the supposed intention of the parties in mind, considerations 
such as equity, good faith, and commercial practice. 
Space does not permit, on this occasion, a discussion of the other common 
objections to will theory, but it is a matter about which more might be said from a 
mixed legal system perspective.   
  
 (c)  An absence of enthusiasm for other  theories of contract 
Given the historical development of a Scots contract theory based originally upon a 
mixture of natural law and rationalism, pared back over time to an emphasis upon the 
                                                 
112 See Atiyah, Essays on Contract (cit at fn 1), ch 2. 
113 J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp 376 – 379.  
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rational choices of the parties, it will be unsurprising that other competing theories of 
contract law – such as reliance, transfer and relational theories – have not found 
favour with Scottish jurists or judges.  
It is remarkable that reliance theory has proved quite so beguiling to some 
contract theorists after so many years of unconvincing promotion and failed 
refinements, as it must surely be evident from even a cursory glance at the law as it 
actually operates that not all contract law is about protecting reasonable reliance, even 
if that may be a judicial motivation in some cases additional to that of enforcing 
agreements because they are voluntary acts of will. It simply cannot be the case, for 
instance, that when executory contracts, upon which neither party has yet to rely, are 
judicially enforced, as they are, courts are doing anything other than enforcing the 
contract because it is the valid and voluntarily assumed will of the parties to be bound 
to an obligation.114 This point has even greater force in a mixed jurisdiction like 
Scotland when one considers remedial entitlement, for in Scots Law the primary 
obligation upon a party is to perform, not just to pay damages if the contract is 
broken, so that the notion that it is reliance based remedies which the courts prefer is 
simply not true. While in practice the exceptions to the situations where an order of 
specific implement will be granted by a Scottish court bring the practical application 
of that remedy very close to that of the specific performance remedy in England, the 
theoretical difference of the primacy of enforcement remedies in Scotland is not only 
a fundamental difference in contractual theory but also one which has practical 
effects. One such practical effect has been the enforcement by Scottish courts of ‘keep 
open’ provisions in leases in circumstances where English courts have maintained a 
somewhat obstinate refusal to enforce what seem, to this observer, clearly drafted and 
unambiguous contractual provisions.115 English landlords studying the difference in 
outcome between these two lines of authority might well find a very profitable reason 
for choosing Scots Law as the lex contractus if not the lex fori.  
Reliance theory in a Scottish context also struggles desperately in explaining the 
existence and enforcement of the separate obligation of promise, an obligation which 
requires no reliance to be given in the form of mutual consideration, nor even in the 
form of an acceptance of the promise, before the promissor is bound by his unilateral 
undertaking. Indeed, a binding promise may be made in favour even of a party not yet 
in existence, such as a limited company which has yet to be incorporated or a natural 
person who has yet to be born, cases where reliance on the promise can hardly exist 
on the part of the promisee. Similar points may be made about the rights of a tertius 
under a jus quaesitum tertio, who need only be informed of the existence of the 
contracting parties’ intention to confer a benefit upon him before the right to enforce 
it comes into being. Reliance plays no part in the constitution or enforcement of a jus 
quaesitum tertio; by contrast, under English Law, reliance by the third party does 
have a role to play, it being relevant to the question of whether the right conferred 
may be varied or extinguished. 116 
It will be evident why reliance theories simply do not work to explain the 
nature of voluntary obligations in Scots Law. Scots Law set its face at an early stage 
against the notion that any reliance was required before contractual or promissory 
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obligations may be enforced. That is not to say that reliance plays no part in Scottish 
contract law, for indeed it does (in the Common Law influenced rules on 
misrepresentation, for instance), but it cannot explain the underlying origin and force 
of voluntary obligations in the Scottish legal system.  
In the absence of any better competing theories to explain contractual rights, 
the native variety of will theory developed by the Scottish writers and courts is 
generally considered to remain the best (albeit imperfect) explanation for contracts 
(and indeed promises) in Scots Law. As indicated, the major competing theory of 
contract – reliance theory – finds especial difficulties with certain peculiar features of 
Scots law (such as the rejection of a doctrine of mutual consideration, and the 
emphasis on performance) in explaining the nature of voluntary obligations.   
 
(d)  The role of good faith in contract theory 
The antipathy of English law to good faith within contract theory or practice is well 
known, the words of Lord Ackner on the role which any such concept might have to 
play in pre-contractual negotiations having for some taken on an almost credal status: 
 
“[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is 
inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when 
involved in negotiations.”117 
 
Some have perhaps slightly over-exaggerated the universal hostility of English law to 
the idea of good faith playing any role in contract law, for, as the more recent case of 
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobas118 demonstrates, the Common Law is 
willing in some circumstances to enforce duties drafted in terms of good faith 
performance. Moreover, the recent inclusion within the JCT Constructing Excellence 
Model Form Contract 2006 of an ‘overriding principle’ of collaboration specifying 
that the parties must work together with each other and all other project participants in 
a co-operative and collaborative manner ‘in good faith’, suggests that English Law is 
going to have rapidly to adjust to a commercial environment where parties may 
increasingly subject themselves to duties with a good faith character. A point blank 
refusal by the judiciary to accord such duties any meaningful content would put the 
courts at odds with commercial practice.  
 Has Scots Law shared the Common Law’s antipathy towards good faith 
playing any role in contract theory or practice? The picture for good faith should 
perhaps be rosier, for, unlike Lord Ackner’s pronouncement, the most oft quoted 
judicial statement on good faith in modern Scots Law is the much more positive 
reference of Lord Clyde in the House of Lords to the “broad principle in the field of 
contract law of fair dealing in good faith.”119 This notion of good faith as a broad 
principle of contract law was affirmed in obiter remarks of Lord Hope, again in the 
House of Lords, that: 
 
“good faith in Scottish contract law, as in South African law, is 
generally an underlying principle of an explanatory and legitimising 
nature rather than an active or creative nature.”120 
 
                                                 
117 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, at 138.  
118 [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121.  
119 Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111, at 121B-C.  
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 The precise nature, or role, which good faith has, or ought to have, in Scots 
Law (creative or explanatory) has been the subject of some academic debate ever 
since Lord Clyde made his rather enigmatic comment in Smith. Much of the debate 
hangs on the questions of whether good faith can explain more coherently existing 
aspects of Scots contract law and theory, and whether a greater and more explicit role 
should be afforded to good faith in guiding the future development of the law.  
In relation to the first of these issues, whether good faith makes sense of 
aspects of the existing law, one test bed for this question is the area of pre-contractual 
theory, in particular liability for pre-contractual actings. Like the court in Walford, 
Scots Law has typically taken a fairly antagonistic attitude to the idea that, before a 
contract is concluded, negotiating parties might owe any duties to each other in 
respect of their actings.121 The courts, in respecting the freedom to contract which is 
at the heart of the will theory of contract law, have regarded as a crucial concomitant 
to that freedom the further freedom not to contract. Thus, typically, no duties will be 
imposed in respect of contractual negotiations if losses are incurred by A in reliance 
upon the belief or expectation that a contract will be entered into with B, but such a 
contract fails to materialise. This is particularly so where no material benefit has 
accrued to B as a result of the alleged losses of A; where such a benefit has accrued, 
unjustified enrichment may provide some recovery for A if the benefit remains in the 
hands of B, or a court may hold that a letter of intent in fact constitutes a preliminary 
contract in force between the parties,122 or exceptionally it may even hold a contract 
to have been concluded despite a failure to agree all its terms.123  
One circumstance however where the desire to protect reliance has been 
allowed to afford relief for pre-contractual losses is a limited category of cases where 
recovery is allowed if one of the negotiating parties has impliedly held out to the other 
that there is a valid contract in place between them when, for whatever reason, such a 
valid contract does not yet exist. A line of cases, beginning with Walker v Milne,124 
has approved of a remedy for recovery of wasted pre-contractual expenditure incurred 
in such circumstances. The availability of the remedy has been restated in modern 
times as very limited, requiring that all the elements of the claim be clearly made out, 
and emphasising that it is an exceptional remedy unavailable if another claim might 
be made (for instance, in delict, for misrepresentation).125  
Hector MacQueen has argued forcefully that this limited remedy for the 
recovery of pre-contractual expenditure is a manifestation of the protection afforded 
to good faith by contract law,126 on the basis that it protects actions undertaken in 
good faith in reliance on an implied assurance as to the existence of a contract. On the 
other hand, it might be argued that it is merely an equitable exception to the formerly 
strict rules on the requirements of writing which has no more necessary connection to 
the idea of good faith than to other broad principles of law like equity, reasonableness, 
or reliance.  The case for recognising the alleged golden thread of good faith running 
through contract theory, including at the pre-contractual stage, seems as yet unproven.  
                                                 
121 Leaving aside recognised avenues of recovery in delict: see Hogg, paras 3.37 – 3.62. 
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Whatever the basis of the limited remedy for wasted pre-contractual 
expenditure, in protecting the reliance of the party erroneously believing a contract to 
be in place it may properly be viewed as one of those limited spheres where it is 
reliance theory which provides the rationale for the existence of the right (admittedly 
pre-contractual rather than contractual stricto sensu) rather than will theory.  
 
(4)  The future for Scots and English contract theory 
 
The ways in which, after the Act of Union between Scotland and England in 1707, 
Scots law came under the influence of the Common Law have been documented 
elsewhere.127 This influence was particularly felt in developments within commercial 
law during the nineteenth century, where, unsurprisingly perhaps, there was a desire 
both within the Court of Session and the House of Lords that free trade within Great 
Britain should not be hampered by legal distinctions. Such a desire led, on occasion, 
to a blind following of the Common Law in preference to the distinct native rules of 
Scots Law, but in the modern era the Scottish courts have become more sensitive to 
the need to ensure that legal harmonisation, where it occurs, does so by reference to 
native rather than transplanted legal reasoning.128 
 Scots contract law in particular was subject to English influence, although this 
influence has been less than in fields like commercial law, and has been felt in some 
areas more than other. Doubtless, a much higher degree of conformity between the 
two jurisdictions would have been achieved had the first joint project of the Scottish 
and English Law Commissions, a proposed joint Contract Code, borne fruit, but it did 
not.129 Scots contract law has retained a number of distinctive features, discussed 
earlier – a separate obligation of promise, the absence of a doctrine of mutual 
consideration, an ancient recognition of jus quaesitum tertio, and an emphasis on 
performance in contract, to name but a few. At the same time, it has made a number 
of borrowings from the Common Law, a unified concept of breach, ‘self-help’ 
remedies for breach, the categorisation of repudiation as breach, and much of the 
doctrine of misrepresentation, among them. It would be encouraging to think that, 
after Scots law’s having borrowed such ideas from English law, it might offer 
something useful back by way of theoretical development to its southern neighbour. If 
that were to be the case, the abolition of the requirement of consideration would make 
for a good start. The continued existence of this doctrine seems to make little sense in 
the modern Common Law. It is defended by some on the basis that it both 
demonstrates seriousness of contractual intent and provides clear evidence of such 
intent. Yet might not seriousness of  intent be demonstrated in other ways? One such 
way could be in a requirement that an obligation be in a particular  form, a 
requirement which Scots Law also insists upon for some obligations.130 Moreover 
                                                 
127 See J Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, in K Reid and R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (cit at fn 6), vol 1. 
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may not one seriously intend to do something even without receiving anything in 
return? As for providing clear evidence of consent, it must be said that the lack of a 
doctrine of consideration in Scots Law does not appear to have created a crisis of 
certainty for the courts in deciding whether or not contracts exist. In fact, when 
questions of uncertainty surrounding contract formation arise before Scottish courts, 
they often do so in cases where mutual consideration has in fact been agreed but 
intention to contract is nonetheless held not to be present.131 
Allied to the abolition of the consideration requirement, a further worthwhile 
development might be an acceptance by the Common Law that unilateral 
undertakings should be more widely recognised.132 English Law already allows 
contracts made under seal to be used as vehicles for some unilateral undertakings, as 
well as recognising that certain situations may give rise to so-called unilateral 
contracts, a concept which should in theory be anathema to the Common Law. It 
would not be such a great leap to develop these exceptions into a general recognition 
that, unilateral undertakings being a universal and frequent feature of human 
behaviour, a properly ordered legal system ought to recognise this by giving these 
undertakings explicit and appropriate legal form. The last serious attempt to develop 
this view, made by Denning J in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees 
House Ltd,133 was interpreted in later cases simply as a form of estoppel rather than a 
substantive obligation, but perhaps the time has come for another attempt to be made.  
Realistically speaking, however, any changes to the Common Law as a result of 
direct Scottish legal influence are unlikely. While, for instance, the general 
enforceability in England since 1999 of unilateral undertakings in the form of third 
party rights134 might suggest that the Common Law is warming somewhat to the idea 
of enforcing rights without the need for mutual consideration,  that development was 
not the result of the influence of Scots Law.135 The Common Law remains largely 
antagonistic to adaptation as a result of outside influences (Lord Ackner’s comments 
in Walford are far from an isolated example), even from its nearest neighbouring legal 
system, preferring to develop at its own pace and, as the example of third party rights 
shows,  under its own initiative. Common Lawyers are not ignorant of Scots contract 
theory, as Atiyah’s discussion of Stair’s ideas in the former’s essay Promising and 
Natural Law demonstrates, but a knowledge of ideas has very seldom translated into 
practical borrowing. 
As for Scots Law, it would be encouraging to think that more time might be 
devoted by writers and the courts to contract theory. Whether this will be so will 
probably depend both on the willingness of the Law Schools to teach it, as well as on 
academics to write about it. It is certainly the case that, after a somewhat barren 
period lasting until the beginning of the 1980s,136 there has been a renewed 
willingness among the Scottish legal academic community to undertake a serious root 
and branch review of the fundamentals of private law. This has transformed the 
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teaching and understanding of private law in Scotland. Moreover, recent involvement 
of Scottish academics in international projects involving other mixed legal systems 
has provided a greater ability to focus on theory in a way that Common Lawyers have 
historically enjoyed through the ability to debate doctrine within the wider English 
speaking Common Law world. The involvement in such projects, as well as the 
general harmonising tendencies of the European Union, raises the question of the 
potential impact of European harmonisation of private law on native contract law. 
While Scots Law has much by way of similar doctrine and rules to Continental 
contract systems, which would probably make any harmonisation easier than for 
English Law, some native aspects of the law would have to be yielded. For instance, 
the draft Common Frame of Reference, while recognising that unilateral promises 
may be enforced, appears to subsume them within its general treatment of contract 
rather than seeing them as a distinct obligation as Scots Law does.137 The challenge, 
for a small mixed jurisdiction like Scotland, is whether, having built up a treasury of 
legal ideas and rules, it is willing to compromise and alter these in an environment 
where supranational harmonisation of laws has the potential to threaten national legal 
identity. The history of Scots law, with its borrowings from Roman, Roman Dutch, 
Canon, and Common Law sources, suggests that such an outward looking attitude 
should not be impossible to achieve, although the perennial question of  political 
independence introduces an unknown variable into the equation of legal development.  
Whatever else may be uncertain, it is clear that Scotland does indeed possess, 
within the family of European legal systems, a distinctive theory of contract law. This 
theory was established on a mixed basis of natural law and rationalism by Stair in the 
seventeenth century, a basis found, through the jettisoning of the natural law element, 
to be adaptable to the needs of a growing mercantile society. The established native 
theory has continued to command general acceptance among academics and 
practitioners, with the result that there has been little interest in looking to competing 
theories of contract law. Given such a history, it seems reasonable to suggest that it 
would be somewhat foolhardy, in the absence of any better general theory of contract 
law, to jettison an established theory which is perceived to continue both to meet the 
demands of practice and satisfactorily to explain the moral and legal force underlying  
contractual obligations.  
                                                 
137 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (Munich: Sellier, 2009), Book II, Art 1:103(2).  
